Temporary contracts, employment protection and skill: A simple model

Elena Casquel and Antoni Cunyat ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 3, 333-336

Abstract: We construct a theoretical labor market that incorporates skill differences across workers to identify under which conditions temporary contracts are a way to access to permanency. Firing costs and unemployment benefits increase the threshold productivity above which workers access to permanency.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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