Bargaining with many players: A limit result

Klaus Kultti () and Hannu Vartiainen ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 3, 249-252

Abstract: We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.

Keywords: Non-cooperative; bargaining; Stationary; equilibrium; Replication; Walrasian; market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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