Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result

Klaus Kultti () and Hannu Vartiainen ()

No 32, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.

Keywords: non-cooperative bargaining; stationary equilibrium; replication; Walrasian market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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