Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking

Michel Balinski, Andrew Jennings and Rida Laraki

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 2, 145-147

Abstract: Borda proposed to assign points to each of m candidates. Condorcet proposed to assign points to each of m! rankings of candidates. One is appropriate for electing, the other for ranking. They satisfy different types of monotonicity that are incompatible.

Keywords: Borda; Condorcet; Incompatibility; Electing; Ranking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:2:p:145-147

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