Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking

Michel Balinski, Andrew Jennings and Rida Laraki ()
Additional contact information
Andrew Jennings: Department of Mathematics and Statistics - ASU - Arizona State University [Tempe]
Rida Laraki: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: Borda proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m candidates. Condorcet proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m! rankings of candidates. The first is more appropriate for electing, the second is more appropriate for ranking. Each satisfies a different type of monotonicity. These monotonicities are incompatible.

Keywords: Social choice; monotonicity; incompatibility; electing; ranking.; Choix social; Borda; Condorcet; monotonie; incompatibilité; élire; classer.; classer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00339030
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking (2009)
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