Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games

Nicola Acocella (), Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 3, 303-305

Abstract: By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and conflict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games.

Keywords: Conflict; of; interest; Coalition; Policy; invariance; Nash; equilibrium; existence; Controllability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games (2009)
Working Paper: Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:3:p:303-305

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