Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio
Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 3, 303-305
By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and conflict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games.
Keywords: Conflict; of; interest; Coalition; Policy; invariance; Nash; equilibrium; existence; Controllability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games (2009)
Working Paper: Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:3:p:303-305
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