Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio
wp.comunite from Department of Communication, University of Teramo
By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and conflict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games.
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Journal Article: Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games (2009)
Working Paper: Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:0054
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