Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games

Nicola Acocella, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio

No 54, CIMEO, Sapienza University of Rome from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome

Abstract: By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and conflict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games.

Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.dipecodir.it/wpcom/data/wp_no_54_2009.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games (2009)
Working Paper: Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:0054

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIMEO, Sapienza University of Rome from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ().