Product market competition, incentives and fraudulent behavior

Rainer Andergassen

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, 201-204

Abstract: The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm's stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders' trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.

Keywords: Executive; compensation; Fraud; Incentives; Product; market; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Product Market Competition, Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:201-204

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