Product Market Competition, Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior

Rainer Andergassen

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm s stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.

Date: 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Product market competition, incentives and fraudulent behavior (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:638

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