Frictional matching: Evidence from law school admission

Pascal Courty and Mario Pagliero

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 2, 208-211

Abstract: We measure friction as the number of unnecessary student applications and school admissions that have to be undertaken per actual matriculation. Friction increases with student and school attractiveness with a decrease at the top.

Keywords: College; admission; Frictional; matching; Assortative; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission (2009)
Working Paper: Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:2:p:208-211

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