Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission

Pascal Courty and Mario Pagliero

No ECO2009/25, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: We measure friction in the matching of students and law schools as the number of unnecessary student applications and school admissions that have to be undertaken per actual matriculation. We show that friction increases with student and school attractiveness, but decreases for top schools and students. We discuss connections with the literature on frictional matching.

Keywords: College admission; frictional matching; assortative matching; student portfolio; school standard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Journal Article: Frictional matching: Evidence from law school admission (2010)
Working Paper: Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission (2009)
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