Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem

Oded Stark

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 3, 286-290

Abstract: The asylum seekers who choose the level of investment in the host-country-specific human capital, and the government of the host country that chooses the probability of naturalization are modeled as optimizing economic agents in a setting not of their choosing.

Keywords: The; probability; of; naturalization; Investment; in; host-country-specific; human; capital; Economic; behavior; of; asylum; seekers; Economic; behavior; of; the; government; of; the; host; country; Stackelberg; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem (2010)
Working Paper: Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem (2010)
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