Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem

Oded Stark

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The asylum seekers who choose the level of investment in the host-country-specific human capital, and the government of the host country that chooses the probability of naturalization are modeled as optimizing economic agents in a setting not of their choosing.

Keywords: The probability of naturalization; Investment in host-country-specific human capital; Economic behavior of asylum seekers; Economic behavior of the government of the host country; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 F20 J24 J41 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Economics Letters 3.108(2010): pp. 286-290

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Related works:
Journal Article: Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem (2010)
Working Paper: Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28902

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