A note on information revelation in procurement auctions

Nicola Doni () and Domenico Menicucci

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 3, 307-310

Abstract: This paper is about a procurement auction setting, introduced in Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), in which suppliers offer differentiated products and the buyer needs to decide whether to reveal or not to the suppliers the own preferences for the various products. We provide some technical remarks and complements to the analysis of Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), and an extension to the case of risk averse suppliers.

Keywords: Information; revelation; Logconcavity; Risk; aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:307-310

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