A note on information revelation in procurement auctions

Nicola Doni () and Domenico Menicucci

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: This paper is about a procurement auction setting, introduced in Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), in which suppliers offer differentiated products and the buyer needs to decide whether to reveal or not to the suppliers the own preferences for the various products. We provide some technical remarks and complements to the analysis of Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), and an extension to the case of risk averse suppliers.

Keywords: Information Revelation; Logconcavity; Risk Aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: A note on information revelation in procurement auctions (2010)
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