Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games
Tore Ellingsen () and
Robert Östling ()
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 2, 90-92
Within a class of games that we call Blame Games, we discuss how strategic risk may discourage play of a unique and efficient (strictly) dominance solvable equilibrium.
Keywords: Coordination; games; Weak-link; games; Coordination; failure; Strategic; risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:2:p:90-92
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