Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation

Sergio Currarini () and Marco Marini

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 3, 223-225

Abstract: This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand. We show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games.

Keywords: Kinked; demand; Symmetric; games; Social; norms; of; behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Kinked Norms of Behaviour and Cooperation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:223-225

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