Kinked Norms of Behaviour and Cooperation

Sergio Currarini and Marco Marini

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand. We show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games.

Keywords: Kinked Demand; Symmetric Games; Social Norms of Behaviour. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 C72 D2 D21 D6 D61 D63 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-10
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Published in Economics Letters 3.110(2011): pp. 223-225

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Related works:
Journal Article: Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:80519

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