A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants

Pablo Amoros

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 3, 241-244

Abstract: We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one different agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule (the winner is the deserving winner) in subgame perfect equilibria.

Keywords: Mechanism; design; Contest; Subgame; perfect; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants (2010)
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