A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants

Pablo Amoros

No 2010-07, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one di¤erent agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule (the winner is the deserving winner) in subgame perfect equilibria.

Keywords: mechanism design; contests; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-7

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