Endowment effects in contests

Curtis Price () and Roman Sheremeta

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 3, 217-219

Abstract: We experimentally study overbidding in contests and find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning can partially explain our findings.

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Contest; Experiments; Overbidding; Endowment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (118)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651100053X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Endowment Effects in Contests (2011)
Working Paper: Endowment Effects in Contests (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:217-219

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().