A note on free entry under uncertainty: The role of asymmetric information

Salvatore Piccolo ()

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 3, 256-259

Abstract: In a model of competing managerial firms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.

Keywords: Asymmetric; information; Free; entry; Uncertainty; Managerial; firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: A Note on Free Entry under Uncertainty: on the Role of Asymmetric Information (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:256-259

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