A Note on Free Entry under Uncertainty: on the Role of Asymmetric Information

Salvatore Piccolo ()

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: In a model of competing managerial .rms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier theoretical contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; free entry; uncertainty; managerial firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D81 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-cta
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Published in Economics Letters, Vol. 111, 256-259.

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http://www.csef.it/WP/wp250.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A note on free entry under uncertainty: The role of asymmetric information (2011)
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