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Is there dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market?

Daifeng He ()

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 1, 113-115

Abstract: This paper finds evidence of dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market. Lower-risk individuals are more likely to cancel a policy, and to cancel one of greater face value conditional on cancelation, than are individuals with higher mortality risk.

Keywords: Dynamic; adverse; selection; Reclassification; risk; Mortality; risk; Lapse; Life; insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:113-115