Is there dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market?
Daifeng He ()
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 1, 113-115
This paper finds evidence of dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market. Lower-risk individuals are more likely to cancel a policy, and to cancel one of greater face value conditional on cancelation, than are individuals with higher mortality risk.
Keywords: Dynamic; adverse; selection; Reclassification; risk; Mortality; risk; Lapse; Life; insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:113-115
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().