Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations

Timo Henckel (), Gordon Menzies, Nick Prokhovnik and Daniel Zizzo

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 2, 144-147

Abstract: We incorporate inferential expectations into the Barro-Gordon model (Barro and Gordon, 1983a) of time inconsistency and consider reputational equilibria. The range of sustainable equilibria shrinks as the private sector becomes more belief-conservative.

Keywords: Credibility; Time; inconsistency; Reputation; Inferential; expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations (2010)
Working Paper: Barro-Gordon Revisited: Reputational Equilibria with Inferential Expectations (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:144-147

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