Barro-Gordon Revisited: Reputational Equilibria with Inferential Expectations

Timo Henckel (), Gordon Menzies, Nicholas Prokhovnik and Daniel Zizzo
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Nicholas Prokhovnik: University of Technology, Sydney

No 18, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We incorporate inferential expectations into the Barro-Gordon model (1983a) of time inconsistency and consider reputational equilibria. The range of sustainable equilibria shrinks as the private sector becomes more belief-conservative.

Keywords: credibility; time inconsistency; reputation; inferential expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mac
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https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/afe/UEA-AFE-018.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations (2011)
Working Paper: Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations (2010)
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