The benefits of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games
M. Fernanda Rivas () and
Matthias Sutter ()
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 2, 176-178
We study the effects of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games when each group member can volunteer to contribute before the other members. We find that voluntary leadership increases contributions significantly, compared to a treatment where leadership is enforced exogenously.
Keywords: Public; goods; Experiment; Voluntary; leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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