Vertical integration and right of first refusal

Luis Cabral and Helder Vasconcelos

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 1, 50-53

Abstract: We consider a partially integrated industry and examine the effects of contracts with a right of first refusal, whereby the vertically integrated firm has the option to match a quote from an independent supplier to supply an independent downstream firm.

Keywords: Vertical; integration; Matching; contracts; Competition; softening; effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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