First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk

François Maréchal and Pierre-Henri Morand ()

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 2, 108-111

Abstract: When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction.

Keywords: Auction; Asymmetry; Risk aversion; Expected revenue (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:2:p:108-111

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.008

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