First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk

François Maréchal () and Pierre-Henri Morand ()
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François Maréchal: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

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Abstract: When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impactof asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders' markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction

Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01313412v1
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Published in Economics Letters, 2011, 113 (2), pp.108--111

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Journal Article: First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk (2011)
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