Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another

Sandro Shelegia and Yossi Spiegel

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 1, 136-138

Abstract: We show that the Bertrand oligopoly model with cost asymmetries may admit multiple Nash equilibria when firms hold passive ownership stakes in each other. The equilibrium price may be as high as the monopoly price of the most efficient firm.

Keywords: Bertrand oligopoly; Cost asymmetry; Partial cross ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176511003326
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:1:p:136-138

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.003

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().