A note on contribution games with loss functions

Giuseppe Russo and Luigi Senatore

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 2, 211-214

Abstract: Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.

Keywords: Public goods; Intergovernmental relations; Noncooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions (2011)
Working Paper: A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:211-214

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.029

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