A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions

Giuseppe Russo and Luigi Senatore

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.

Keywords: Public Goods; Intergovernmental Relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in Economics Letters, 2012, 115(2), 211–214

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http://www.csef.it/WP/wp302.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A note on contribution games with loss functions (2012)
Working Paper: A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:302

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