Sabotage in teams

Matthias Kräkel and Daniel Müller

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 2, 289-292

Abstract: We show that a team may favor self-sabotage to influence the principal’s contract decision. Sabotage increases a team member’s bonus and total team effort. If these benefits outweigh the reduction in the success probability, sabotaging the team is rational.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Sabotage; Self-handicapping; Teamwork (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 J3 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:289-292

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.041

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