On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility

Xavier Ruiz del Portal

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 1, 42-45

Abstract: Implementability conditions in Rochet (1987) are extended to utility functions not necessarily quasilinear in the transfer, or linear in the type, for the case where agents’ information is one-dimensional but actions become multidimensional. The results obtained are relevant for the characterization of optimal mechanisms in adverse selection and moral hazard problems.

Keywords: Incentive compatibility; Monotonicity constraints; Optimal mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:42-45

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.103

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