On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

James Boudreau () and Nicholas Shunda ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 3, 498-501

Abstract: We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players’ perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize’s material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategies and the behavior induced by evolutionarily stable preferences.

Keywords: Contest; Prize valuation; Preference evolution; Evolutionarily stable preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:498-501

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.059

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