On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

James Boudreau () and Nicholas Shunda ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize's material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce and evolutionarily stable strategies.

Keywords: Contest; Prize valuation; Preference evolution; Evolutionarily stable preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:24640

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