The importance of the electoral rule: Evidence from Italy

Massimo Bordignon () and Andrea Monticini

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 322-325

Abstract: We test the effect of an important electoral reform implemented in Italy from 1993 to 2001, that moved the system for electing the Parliament from purely proportional to a plurality rule (for 75% of the seats). We do not find any effect on either the number of parties or the stability of governments (the two main objectives of the reform) that remained unchanged at their pre-reform level.

Keywords: Electoral system; Plurality rule; Duverger’s law; Bootstrap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Importance of the Electoral Rule: Evidence from Italy (2011)
Working Paper: The importance of electoral rule: Evidence from Italy (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:322-325

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.035

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