The Importance of the Electoral Rule: Evidence from Italy

Massimo Bordignon () and Andrea Monticini

No 3347, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We employ bootstrap methods (Efron (1979)) to test the effect of an important electoral reform implemented in Italy from 1993 to 2001, that moved the system for electing the Par-liament from purely proportional to plurality rule (for 75% of the seats). We do not find any effect on either the number of parties or the stability of governments (the two main objectives of the reform) that remained unchanged at their pre-reform level.

Keywords: electoral system; plurality rule; Duverger's law; bootstrap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The importance of the electoral rule: Evidence from Italy (2012)
Working Paper: The importance of electoral rule: Evidence from Italy (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3347

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