Corporate visibility and executive pay

Bruce Rayton, Stephen Brammer and Suwina Cheng

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 337-339

Abstract: This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.

Keywords: Visibility; Incentive pay; Implicit regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512003126
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:337-339

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().