Corruption driven by imitative behavior

Elvio Accinelli and Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 84-87

Abstract: One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior.

Keywords: Corrupt behavior; Evolutionary dynamics; Imitative behavior; Institutions and operations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D02 K42 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:84-87

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.092

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