Partnership dissolution mechanisms in the laboratory

Thomas Kittsteiner, Axel Ockenfels and Nadja Trhal

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 2, 394-396

Abstract: We experimentally compare two partnership dissolution mechanisms, the widely-used buy–sell clause and the winner’s bid auction. While standard theory does well in organizing many laboratory patterns, it does not easily capture that many subjects bid valuations, especially in the buy–sell clause. As a result of this behavior, the buy–sell clause weakly outperforms the auction with respect to efficiency.

Keywords: Partnership dissolution; Buy–sell clause; Shotgun clause; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:394-396

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.084

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