Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams

John Heywood and Matthew McGinty

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 566-568

Abstract: This paper models the behavior of team members in a consistent conjectures equilibrium. When subject to scale economies, team members produce more than Nash and when subject to scale diseconomies, they produce less than Nash. Moreover, even when effort levels of team members are perfect substitutes in production, they can be strategic complements in the face of scale economies. Finally, with sufficient scale economies, the complementarity eliminates free-riding and the team optimum is obtained.

Keywords: Team production; Scale economies; Consistent conjectures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:566-568

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.027

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