Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Patrick Schmitz

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 642-645

Abstract: An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (2013)
Working Paper: Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:642-645

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.016

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