Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Patrick Schmitz

No 9065, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (2013)
Journal Article: Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (2012)
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