Binding promises and cooperation among strangers

Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari and Maria Bigoni

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 3, 459-461

Abstract: In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

Keywords: Coordination; Cheap-talk; Deception; Repeated game; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Binding Promises and Cooperation among Strangers (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:3:p:459-461

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.009

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