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Binding Promises and Cooperation among Strangers

Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari and Maria Bigoni

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

Keywords: coordination; cheap-talk; deception; repeated game; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... -among-strangers.pdf

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Journal Article: Binding promises and cooperation among strangers (2013) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-27

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