Matching with quorums

Daniel Monte () and Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 1, 14-17

Abstract: In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism.

Keywords: Matching; Efficiency; Serial dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Matching with Quorums (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:1:p:14-17

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.007

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