Matching with quorums
Daniel Monte () and
Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()
Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 1, 14-17
In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism.
Keywords: Matching; Efficiency; Serial dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Matching with Quorums (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:1:p:14-17
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