Matching with Quorums
Daniel Monte () and
Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University
We study the problem of allocating workers to different projects in which each project requires having a minimum number of workers assigned to it or else it does not open. We show that the well-known serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy-proof nor Pareto efficient. Thus, we propose an algorithm, denoted as the serial dictatorship with project closures, which is strategy-proof and also Pareto efficient over the set of all feasible allocations.
Keywords: matching; stability; efficiency; serial dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ppm
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Journal Article: Matching with quorums (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-10
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